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 Abstract 
In response to publicized shootings of minority civilians, several police agencies across 
the county have announced that they will hire more minority police officers. However, there is a 
dearth of quantitative research examining real-life consequences of police diversity. Between 
1969 and 2000, a number of police departments were sued for racial and gender discrimination, 
and many responded by putting into place affirmative action policies. We use affirmative action 
litigation status of police departments to proxy for increases in workforce diversity, relying on 
evidence from previous studies with access to confidential demographic information on police 
workforces. Using litigation information on 479 of the largest state and local U.S. police 
departments and hospital data from counties across the U.S., we ​estimate the effect of affirmative 
action litigation on ​various measures of crime and deaths. We introduce a method to measure 
affirmative action litigation exposure at the county level, as our outcome variables are at the 
county level while our legal data is at the agency level. Our analysis relies on the assumption that 
all counties in our sample would have been on the same trend if they had the same exposure to 
litigated policing. We find that increases in exposure to affirmative action litigation led to a 
decrease in the probability that there would be a death due to police interaction for all persons, 
and this effect was driven by deaths among nonwhites. We also find a decrease in arrests after 
affirmative action litigation for all persons.  
 
1. Introduction 
Widely publicized deaths of African Americans by police have catapulted the issues of 
race and law enforcement into the center of public discourse. In response to public outcry, 
various mayors and police chiefs across the nation have announced goals to hire more officers of 
color. However, does police diversification actually result in better treatment of minority 
civilians? How does diversity affect policing, community violence, and mental health?  
To begin to address the workings of law enforcement, it is important to consider who our 
police officers are. Police departments today are certainly more diverse than those of the 1950s 
and 1960s, but progress is not as fast as one would hope. Large urban locations, as well as areas 
targeted by litigation, have achieved more progress in diversifying their police forces than other 
areas (Fan, 2016). In fact, law enforcement is arguably the U.S. sector with the most aggressive 
externally imposed affirmative action policies (McCrary 2007; Miller and Segal, 2012; Sklansky, 
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 2006). In our paper, we will assess the impact of affirmative action litigation on various 
measures of crime and deaths. Although affirmative action litigation could impact these 
outcomes through other channels, we believe the primary channel is through police diversity 
because it is the primary goal of litigation, and several papers find that litigation increased the 
hiring of minority officers. In the first stage of his work, Lott (2000) finds that affirmative action 
plans for police departments resulted in employment share gains for minorities and women. 
McCrary (2007) and Miller and Segal (2012) find that affirmative action litigation alone 
successfully increased the proportion of minority officers hired in police departments. Miller and 
Segal (2012) further find that departments with explicit affirmative action policies increased 
minority shares more than departments that were merely litigated, and that employment gains 
due to litigation are sustained even after the termination of affirmative action policies.  
Our project will essentially base its identification strategy from McCrary (2007) and 
Miller and Segal (2012). Because affirmative action litigation successfully increased minority 
employment, we will use the litigation status of police departments to proxy for increases in 
workforce diversity. The primary contribution of our paper is the introduction of the new 
outcome variables--deaths due to law enforcement, homicides, deaths due to gun violence, and 
suicides. ​Note that even if we did have data on police demographics, we would still focus on the 
affirmative action litigation as an instrument for police diversity. In our analysis, we simply 
estimate the reduced form effect of litigation on our outcome variables, relying on estimates of 
the first stage from McCrary (2007) and Miller and Segal (2012). 
We obtained a legal database that was compiled by Miller and Segal that includes the 
affirmative action litigation status of the ​479 largest state and local police departments in the 
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 U.S. In all, 140 of the 479 departments were litigated. For the outcome variables, we used the 
Vital Statistics Multiple Causes of Death data from the National Center for Health Statistics for 
county-level information on deaths. We are particularly interested in a variable called “deaths 
due to legal intervention”, which indicates the number of deaths due to police interactions for a 
county. We will also examine data on civilian-on-civilian homicides and deaths due to 
intentional firearms use, which are indicative of violence within a community. We are also 
interested in suicides, as suicides are an indicator of mental health. It is plausible that 
diversification of officers may affect the way police interact with civilians. If that is the case, 
diversification may impact the stress levels (and ultimately mental health) of groups that are 
more likely to have frequent interactions with the police  Finally, we will use data on deaths due 
to drug dependency and drug related arrests to control for the  crack cocaine crisis during the 
1970s and 1980s--the time during which much of the litigation took place. To the best of our 
knowledge, the Vital Statistics dataset has not been used much in the economics literature to 
conduct police-related research. 
Because the legal data is at the agency level and our outcome variables are at the county 
level, we used data from the Uniform Crime Reports to generate measures of the fraction of 
policing in each county (which may contain several police agencies) that would have been 
affected by a litigated department. We use the variation in timing of litigation to compare trends 
of counties with more exposure to affirmative action litigation to counties with less exposure to 
litigation. The identifying assumption is that these counties would have been on the same trend if 
they had the same exposure to litigated policing. To deal with possible differences between these 
counties, we include both county trends and state-year fixed effects in our regressions. Another 
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 serious concern is that affirmative action litigation may be endogenous. It is very possible that 
litigated departments were not randomly chosen to be litigated. Previous research has not found 
strong evidence of targeted affirmative action, but McCrary and Miller and Segal note that 
litigated departments had presided over larger populations where the minority employment did 
not keep up with the growing minority populations at the time of their litigation. To see if our 
parallel trend assumption would be called into question, we conducted event studies in which we 
generated dummy variables for 5 years before and after the earliest year an agency within a 
county was litigated, and included our main regression controls. In all, our paper makes the 
following contributions: it uses hospital data to examine police deaths that does not seem to have 
been used in previous economics research, it introduces a method to gauge affirmative action 
litigation exposure at the county level, and it explores important real-life consequences of police 
diversity that have not been researched much before.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses relevant 
literature from various fields pertaining to diversity, biases, affirmative action policies, and 
policing. Section three describes the empirical strategy and specification, while section four 
describes the data that we use. Section five presents and discusses the results of our 
specifications and event studies. Section six discusses limitations to our strategy, and section 
seven summarizes our main takeaways.  
 
2. Literature 
2A. Theoretical Basis and Existing Police Diversity Research 
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 Theoretically, there are strong reasons to hypothesize that police diversification can 
increase police effectiveness and reduce racial tensions. Diversity within the force can increase a 
department’s credibility and trustworthiness in a community. This fundamental trust can help 
diffuse tension, increase community cooperation in investigation and solving crime, and create 
an environment in which citizens can rely on the police for fair treatment (DOJ and EEOC, 
2015). On the other hand, any actual or potential abuses of power from unrepresentative police 
departments may exacerbate public distrust and violence (Kerner Report, 1968).  
Despite all of the theory, however, quantitative research examining the effect of police 
diversity on minority outcomes such as death and arrests has been relatively sparse (Fan, 2016). 
Strangely, diversity is one of the most dramatic changes to ever happen in the U.S. police force, 
but one of the least researched changes in the field (Sklansky, 2006).  
2B. Racial Bias 
Existing research suggests that there is biased behavior against minorities. In the 
psychology literature, there is strong support for the phenomena of implicit bias--a bias that 
stems from subtle cognitive processes, such as implicit stereotypes, that operate at a level below 
conscious awareness and without intentional control. Implicit racial bias against African 
Americans is very well documented. Negative, threatening connotations are easily associated 
with Blacks, ​while strong positive connotations are more easily associated with Whites 
(Greenwald et al., 1998; Dasgupta et al., 1999)​. This pattern may also exist in a policing setting. 
A virtual reality simulation showed that unarmed blacks were incorrectly shot more than whites, 
and objects held by blacks were more likely to be perceived as weapons (Greenwald et al., 
2003). Even in the most well-intentioned people, these implicit biases can leak into behaviors 
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 and disadvantage relevant minority groups (Greenwald and Krieger, 2006). Biased behavior 
against minorities--whether motivated by explicit or implicit bias--produces disparities in 
real-life outcomes. One particular study was able to isolate race effects from other factors such as 
attractiveness, nonverbal behaviors, and physiognomy. Ayres et al. (2015) sold baseball cards on 
ebay with photos of white or black hands displaying the card. They found that baseball cards 
with a black hand model sold for significantly less for the exact same card with a white hand 
model, indicating that racial inequalities persist in real-world markets. Race, all other factors 
constant, is likely to influence other outcomes as well. 
Policing is no exception: it is generally agreed upon that African Americans have a 
higher probability of being arrested than whites (Smith et al. 1984; Anwar and Fang, 2004). 
Criminologists have highlighted how police officers resort to deadly force more frequently in 
areas with greater racial and economic stratification, along with places of higher minority 
concentrations (Fan, 2016). Processes such as implicit bias may play a large role in policing, as 
policing often requires that officers rely on automatic, instinctive and intuitive thought processes 
(system 1) as opposed to more logical, deliberative, and slow thought processes (system 2) 
(Kahneman, 2011). Although fast and convenient, system 1 is extremely vulnerable to biases and 
stereotypes. Thus, instances in which police must quickly decide to fire a gun, or to pursue a 
speeding car may be influenced by obviously observable characteristics, such as race. This is 
particularly problematic within the police force because biased behavior can lead to fatal 
outcomes. 
 
2C. Why Diverse Workforces May Make a Difference 
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 Although people of all races are vulnerable to explicit and implicit biases, diverse 
workforces may have different collective behaviors towards minority clients than homogenous 
workforces. At the individual level, minority employees may exhibit different individual 
behaviors towards their clients. Although most studies of implicit bias have been conducted with 
white Americans, there is some evidence that African Americans have less negative implicit bias 
towards blacks than whites (Greenwald et al., 2003; Greenwald and Krieger, 2006). Various 
studies have also found that race-matching teachers and students may improve educational 
performance, particularly of minority students (Dee, 2004; Egalite et al. 2015). This finding may 
reflect systematic differences in individual teacher characteristics that vary by race, or it may 
indicate a benefit of race matching. There seems to be more support for the latter possibility of 
matching, rather than racial differences in individual teacher characteristics (Egalite et al., 2015).  
In the police force, minority officers may increase the legitimacy of the police to the 
public, especially among minority citizens (Smith, 2003). Perhaps this is because minority 
officers can serve as role models, advocates, or cultural translators for other minorities in the 
community. Yet, law enforcement has historically been examined as if it were one monolithic 
group--that it was completely white, male, and straight (Sklansky, 2006). Under this assumption, 
minority officers are expected to exhibit the same behaviors as white officers. However, this may 
not be the case: Anwar and Fang applied their model of police-search behavior to 
stop-and-search data from Florida and found that black, hispanic, and white police officers 
searched people by race at different rates (2006). Additionally, increasing minority officers will 
increase contact between white and minority officers, and could potentially change the police 
department’s perception of minorities in the long run. All of these reasons suggest that more 
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 diversity within a workforce  may impact minority outcomes, and that more research should be 
directed towards studying diversity in law enforcement (Smith, 2003).  
 
2D. Existing Research on Police Diversity 
Some studies have attempted to examine the effect of minority officers on various 
minority outcomes. In the criminology field, studies on single departments have produced mixed 
and null results on the effects of police diversification on deaths due to law enforcement (Fan, 
2016; Smith, 2003). Donohue and Levitt (2001) conducted one of the first nationwide studies 
that empirically examined the effect of police diversity on tangible minority outcomes by using 
size and racial composition of re departments as an instrument for white and nonwhite police. 
This method relies on the assumption that changes in the fire department staff are not related to 
changes in crime, but are associated with changes in the police force. Donohue and Levitt found 
that increases in the number of minority police are associated with signicant increases in arrests 
of whites, but have little impact on arrests of nonwhites. On the other hand, more white police 
were associated with an increased amount of nonwhite arrests but did not seem to affect the 
arrests of whites. Their work suggests that the demographic makeup of the police force does 
indeed affect the demographic composition of those arrested. In a later study, McCrary (2007) 
used affirmative action litigation across various police departments brought forth at different 
years as a natural experiment. He found that an increase in minority officers led to a slight 
decrease in minority arrests. Lott (1998) attempts to address how police diversity affects civilian 
shootings by using civilian death data of 12 cities from 1987 to 1990 that was compiled by 
Geller and Scott (1992). He runs a simple regression with city and year fixed effects that show an 
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 association between higher proportions of black or white male officers with lower civilian 
shootings. However, he acknowledges that he cannot conclude causality, as there were only 24 
observations in his sample and many omitted variables in his regression. Our paper expands on 
this issue by examining a much larger sample size over a much larger timespan and introduces a 
more rigorous methodology.  
 
2E. Affirmative Action in Other Sectors 
An effective way to increase the proportion of minorities within a workforce is to 
implement an affirmative action policy. A study of 100,000 large private firms, some of which 
were required to implement affirmative action policies, found that the largest minority share 
gains in employment occurred within the first four years of the policy implementation. These 
employment share gains were found to persist even after the firms were no longer required to 
have affirmative action policies (Kurtulus, 2016). In education, various models predict that 
affirmative action will increase minority enrollment (Furstenberg, 2007).  Although there have 
not been many empirical studies on the implementation of affirmative action on minority college 
enrollment in the U.S., there have been quite a few studies examining the dismantlement of 
affirmative action policies. Hinrichs (2012) finds that bans on affirmative action decreased 
underrepresented minority enrollment and increased white enrollment at selective colleges 
nationwide. Bans on race-based affirmative action in California and Texas have produced similar 
results (Antonovics and Backes, 2013; Tienda, 2003). There have also been studies on 
affirmative action in Brazilian universities. Overall, these studies find that the proportion of 
targeted minorities (Afro Brazilians) accepted in universities increased as a result of affirmative 
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 action (Francis and Tannuri-Pianto, 2012). In all, affirmative action has been found to 
successfully increase the proportion of targeted groups hired or admitted in various sectors. 
These results support the notion that affirmative action litigation in police departments increased 
the proportion of minority officers hired.  
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
In our empirical work, we focus on the reduced form effect of affirmative action 
litigation as a proxy for police diversity. Essentially, we compare counties with litigated police 
departments (“litigated counties”), and counties with unlitigated police departments (“unlitigated 
counties”), taking advantage of variation over time in when departments were litigated. ​The 
identifying assumption is that these counties would have been on the same trend if they had the 
same exposure to litigated policing. To deal with possible differences between these counties, we 
include both county trends and state-year fixed effects in our regressions. We must also address a 
data challenge. ​Our outcome variables are at the county-year level, but the police departments in 
the legal database operate at various different levels. There are city, county, and state agencies, 
and there may be multiple agencies operating within the same county. For example, a county 
may be policed by a county agency, but also have multiple city police departments operating 
within that county, along with state troopers patrolling any highways that run through the county. 
Thus, we use the UCR data to generate four different county-level measures of exposure to 
litigation; these measures aim to estimate the fraction of police interactions in the county that are 
governed by affirmative action litigation. We restrict the analysis to counties with agencies in 
Miller and Segal (2012)’s legal database, as we cannot assume that agencies not in the database 
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 were unlitigated. There may be litigated agencies that are not included in the legal database, but 
are in relevant counties; this would make our estimates conservative. Our main regression is as 
follows: 
 
Y​cst​=β​0​ + β​1​ exposuretoAAlitigation​ct​ + β​2​ proportion_minority​ct​ + β​3​ ln(county _population)​ct  
+ γ​c​ * year​t​ + γ​st​ + ε​cst 
 
The subscripts represent the following: c is county, s is state, and t is time. In addition to 
the measure of exposure to litigation, we have also included controls for the proportion of 
minorities living within a county, the log of the county’s population, county linear trends, and 
state-year interaction fixed effects. We included both county trends and state-year fixed effects 
as there is reason to believe that affirmative action litigation was not random. To make the 
inclusion of state-year fixed effects possible, we excluded state departments when forming 
variables that measure the amount of affirmative action litigation exposure a county has. This 
decision is further supported by the fact that  city and county agencies shoulder significantly 
more responsibility in dealing with violent crime than state agencies. By including these 
controls, we account for as much of the pre-existing trends as possible.  
We will run this regression first examining the trend for all persons, and then by race. We 
specifically look at trends for whites, non-whites, and blacks (non-whites includes blacks). For 
the outcome variables, we will look at whether or not an agency had any deaths due to legal 
intervention (“anylegal”), as well as the log of deaths due to legal intervention, homicides, 
intentional gun use (a subset of homicides), suicides, and arrests. When generating the logged 
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 outcome variables, we added “1” to each observation so we could include observations with a 
“0” value. We focus on whether or not a county had any deaths due to legal intervention rather 
than the log because a cursory glance at the legal intervention observations showed that, on 
average, there were very few deaths due to legal intervention in a county in a year.  
As a robustness check, we will also run a series of regressions that are restricted only to 
counties that have ever had an agency within them be litigated. By restricting to these counties, 
we focus solely on time variation and eliminate potential differences between counties without 
litigated agencies and counties with litigated agencies.  
 
3A. Concerns of endogeneity and parallel trend assumption 
As mentioned before, there are some concerns that affirmative action litigation may be 
endogenous. It is possible that litigation was the result of societal trends or political pressure, or 
that the selection of litigated departments was strategic. Any of these situations would raise 
concerns on the validity of the analysis. Indeed, McCrary (2007) and Miller and Segal (2012) do 
not believe that the litigation was completely random--litigated departments tended to serve 
larger populations and had minority employment that didn’t rise as quickly as the city share. 
However, both papers failed to find strong evidence of strategic targeting or an influence of 
social trends. McCrary notes that previous research has failed to find any strategic patterns in 
litigation. Additionally, most of the litigation in his database did not include civil rights groups. 
If social or political pressure were driving factors in police litigation, there would have been 
more involvement of these groups. McCrary also finds that there is a correlation between riots 
and the likelihood that the presiding police department will be litigated. However, this 
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 relationship seems mostly to result from population: larger cities are more likely to experience a 
riot. Once population is controlled for, the positive relationship between riots and the likelihood 
of litigation becomes insignificant. Miller and Segal also examine the effect of school 
desegregation. Although they found a positive relationship between school desegregation and 
police diversity, they found that this change only had an effect 25-30 years after school 
desegregation happened. They thus argue that social/political pressure resulting from school 
desegregation probably did not drive affirmative action litigation in police; rather, the increased 
minority employment at police departments may have been due to human capital gains of 
minorities once they had access to higher quality schools.  
 
3B. Addressing Endogeneity Concerns 
Our specification above addresses some of these concerns about endogeneity. 
Specifically, we focus only on the counties that contain the largest police departments and we 
include county-specific linear trends as well as state-year interactions. Nevertheless, we further 
address possible concerns about endogeneity by conducting an event study. That is, we estimate 
separate effects of litigation for the 5 years before litigation and the 5 years after litigation. 
Unfortunately, this strategy does not allow us to take advantage of variation in how many 
agencies in a county may have been litigated or how large they are, since different agencies 
would have been litigated at different times. Instead we focus on the earliest year any agency in a 
county (excluding state agencies) was litigated. We generated dummy variables for each number 
of years since litigation from 5 years prior to litigation to 5 years post. Years in which a county 
was litigated are omitted, as are counties in which no agency was litigated: all these dummy 
14 
 variables are 0. The dummy variables for “-5” and “5” also include county-years earlier or later 
than 5 years of the earliest year any agency in the county was litigated. We also kept the same 
controls that were in our main regression. Our event study regression is below: 
 
Y​cst​=β​0​ + β​1​ DV_-5​ct​  + β​2​ DV_-4​ct​… + β​10​ DV_5​ct​+ β​11​ proportion_minority​ct​ +  
β​12​ ln(county _population)​ct​ + γ​c​ * year​t​ + γ​st​ + ε​cst 
 
Again, it is important to note that this method does not account for the size of the litigated 
police-civilian interactions for the counties. Nevertheless, our event studies may provide insight 
as to whether or not the parallel trend assumption (PTA)  holds--that in the absence of litigation, 
the litigated and unlitigated counties would have had parallel trends in the outcome variable. For 
the PTA to have credibility, the coefficients on dummy variables from before litigation should be 
insignificant and have no obvious trend. If litigation has any effects, we would expect to see 
significant values of the same sign for the coefficients of the post litigation dummy variables. 
The coefficients will essentially capture the difference in the outcome variable between litigated 
and unlitigated counties.  
4. Data 
We use data from four sources: 1) data on which departments were litigated at what time 
from Miller and Segal (2012), 2) Multiple Causes of Death data from the National Center for 
Health Statistics (NCHS),  3) county-level population and demographic data from the 
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research​ (ICPSR) and Duke libraries, and 4) 
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 data on departments’ jurisdictions, including crime and arrests from the Uniform Crime Reports 
(UCR).  
4A. Legal Information 
1. Police Duties 
The legal database includes information from agencies at the city, county, and state 
levels. Each level has specific duties. ​State police agencies mostly patrol highways or enforce 
regulations (Ebbe, 2013). They may also do some of the following tasks: assist local agencies in 
criminal investigations, maintain state crime records, train municipal and county police officers, 
and patrol state highways (Hoffman, 2000). State police tasks may vary depending on the state, 
but it is clear that state police do not do most of the policing of violent crime.  
Local law enforcement agencies include sheriffs, county, and city police. County police 
and sheriffs generally preside over rural areas that are not covered by city police, and may 
provide support to city and municipal police forces (Bureau of Justice Statistics, n.d.). 
Additionally, they may have other duties such as operating county jails and serving in county 
courts. City agencies comprise the largest number of police departments, and tend to shoulder the 
largest responsibility in dealing with violent crime (Hoffman, 2000). County or state agencies 
may provide additional support to city agencies in policing their jurisdictions. As these different 
agency levels offer different types of policing services, it is important to keep this in mind when 
proceeding with our analysis.  
 
2. Legal Database 
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 For data on when police departments were litigated, we use a legal database compiled by 
Miller and Segal (2012). They individually researched the 479 largest state and local police 
departments in the U.S. by using the LexisNexis and Westlaw federal case databases for any 
information pertaining to litigation involving sex/race discrimination in employment. For 
missing information, they contacted individual departments and the Department of Justice 
(DOJ). Miller and Segal also cross-referenced their results with DOJ data involving police 
department employment discrimination cases, along with databases used by McCrary (2007), 
Lott (2000), and survey data from the National Center for Women and Policing (2001). 
Departments for which Miller and Segal found no evidence of litigation are coded as 
“unlitigated”. To the extent that any litigated departments were missed,  our estimates will be 
conservative, i.e. biased against finding significant effects of litigation.  
In all, 140 of the 479 departments were litigated. A breakdown of the department levels, 
along with their litigated status are in Table 1. As I have information on almost all of the states, I 
plotted litigated states to see if there was any discernable pattern (see Figure 1). Indeed, most of 
the litigated states are concentrated on the east side of the country. This raises some concerns 
about comparing litigated states to unlitigated states, since litigation may have been brought forth 
strategically by legal groups. 
 
Table 1: Database Agency Level and Litigation Status 
Department 
Level 
Litigated Unlitigated Total 
Observations 
State 23 26 49 
County 29 145 175 






Figure 1: Litigated State Agencies 
 
*States with litigated state departments in blue 
One of the ways in which we address this possible endogeneity is by restricting our 
observations to counties that have litigation information on at least one agency in Miller and 
Segal’s legal dataset. We also do not use state agencies to generate our exposure variables. 
Overall, we examine 264 counties, with 95 that have had at least one agency litigated and 169 
with no agencies litigated. The majority of county and city litigations occurred in the 1970s, with 













Figure 2: Litigated Agencies by Year 
 
In terms of location, relevant litigation (city and county agencies) was relatively well 
dispersed throughout the country, though the Northwest of the U.S. does not appear to be 
affected (see figure 3 below). However, it is important to note that there may be litigated 
agencies in the Northwest states that are too small to show up in the legal database. As long as 
these agencies are not in counties in which any agency was large enough to show up in the legal 
database, these omissions will not affect our results. Overall, the map lends support to the idea 







Figure 3: Location of Litigated Agencies 
 
*More intense color indicates a higher number of agencies litigated in the state. White states do not have any 
litigated agencies in the legal database.  
 
We assume that agencies that are not in the legal database but are included in the 
observed counties were never litigated. As it is likely that there are litigated agencies in the 
relevant counties that are not recorded in our database, the results of our analysis will be biased 




 4B. Mortality Data 
The most comprehensive database that criminologists use for police-related homicides is 
the Vital Statistics Multiple Causes of Death data (May, 2016), which derives information on 
various causes of death, broken-down by race from death certificates. In this dataset, medical 
professionals determine the cause of death rather than law enforcement agencies, and it is 
managed by the NCHS-- an umbrella organization under the ​Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC)​. I will be using information from 1968-2004. ​The dataset includes every death 
that occurred in the U.S. in each year and indicates the underlying cause of death for each death. 
One possible cause of death listed is “death due to legal intervention.”​ We will be using this 
variable as an indicator of any deaths due to police interaction. We will also examine data on 
civilian-on-civilian homicides and deaths due to intentional firearms use, which are indicative of 
violence within a community. I am also interested in suicides, as suicides are an indicator of 
mental health. It is plausible that diversification of officers may affect the way police interact 
with civilians. If that is the case, diversification may impact the stress levels (and ultimately 
mental health) of groups that are more likely to have frequent interactions with the police 
Finally, I will use data on deaths due to drug dependency, as there was a crack cocaine crisis 
during the 1970s and 1980s--the time during which much of the litigation took place. To the best 
of our knowledge, this dataset has not been used much in the economics literature to conduct 
police-related research.  
 
4C. Uniform Crime Reports 
1. Offenses Known and Clearances by Arrest 
21 
 The UCR’s Offenses Known and Clearances by Arrest provides agency-level data with 
information on the population of an agency’s jurisdiction and total offenses recorded. The data is 
compiled by the FBI and over 14,000 police agencies across the U.S. voluntarily contribute 
crime information. We obtained the data for 1968-2004 from McCrary(2007).  
For each agency, the UCR lists the county the agency operates in as well as the 
population and reported offenses of the agency’s jurisdiction in that county (e.g. the population 
of a city in the county, not necessarily the entire population of the county). We used this 
information to generate our four affirmative action litigation exposure variables. For our 
preferred measure, we use the weighted fraction of agencies that have been previously litigated, 
where agencies are weighted by the agency jurisdiction’s population in that year. We also 
calculate a similar weighted fraction of litigated agencies using the agency jurisdiction’s 
population for the earliest year of data available, starting from 1968-1978. We chose a range of 
years because the UCR was missing population data for some agencies in the early years. A third 
measure uses the number of offenses each agency reported for each year as the weights and a 
fourth measure uses the number of offenses each agency reported for the earliest year of data 
available from 1968-1978. Our population-weighted measures are our prefered measure because 
while offenses may better reflect the level of policing or crime each agency deals with,offenses 
may also be endogenous . The regressions with the offense weights will serve as a robustness 
check.  
2. Arrests 
The UCR’s Arrests by Age, Sex, and Race provides agency-level demographic 
information on arrests. They also include information on the purpose of the arrest, such as theft, 
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 murder, and drug-possession. For our analysis, we are particularly interested in the total arrests 
and drug-related arrests that this data provides. We will be converting this information to the 
county level in our analysis so our unit of observations are uniform.  
 
4D. Population Data 
We retrieved county-level demographic data from two sources. From 1960s-1970s, we 
used data from the ICPSR. Data from 1960 was derived from the Eighteenth Decennial Census 
of the United States, 1960 Population, Volume I, Characteristics of the Population., while the 
1970 data was derived from  1970 Census of Population, Series PC(2v), Advance Report. For the 
1980s, we used the ICPSR’s Revised Estimates of the Population of Counties by Age, Sex, and 
Race, which has population estimates for each year (rather than by decade). The ICPSR received 
this information from the Bureau of the Census.  
From 1990s-2000s, we obtained data from the Duke University collections. Their 
information is from the U.S. Census Population Estimates, and provides county-level, annual 
population estimates by race.  
 
4E. Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics are shown in Table 2. Overall, we can see that the 
population-weighted exposure measures indicate a lower average (and less variable) proportion 
of a county that is governed by affirmative action litigation than the offense-weighted exposure 
measures. Additionally, initial population and initial offense exposure measures to the earliest 
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 year of data available indicate a higher average (and greater variation) than the weights that vary 
for each year.  
We have information on 9,081 county-years. For deaths due to legal intervention (“legal 
deaths”), we can see that counties generally had very few. This supports our decision to examine 
whether a county had a legal death at all. The mean of the any legal death variable is 0.34--the 
average probability that there will be a death due to legal intervention in our sample. Also, it is 
interesting to note that on average, there is a higher number of nonwhites who are victims of 
homicide and gun deaths than whites, and more nonwhites are arrested and are arrested due to 
drug-related reasons than whites. This is despite the fact that whites are the majority population. 
The numbers give credence to the idea that minorities have more interactions with the police, 
whether justified or not.  
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 Table 2: Summary Statistics 
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 5. Results 
5A. Main Regressions 
Relevant results for the main regression are displayed in Table 3. Each row presents the 
coefficient on exposure to affirmative action litigation for a different dependent variable. Each 
pair of columns presents the results for a different demographic group (note non-whites includes 
blacks, even though they are also separated out in the last pair of columns); the first of each pair 
uses the current-population-weighted measure of exposure and the second uses the initial 
population weighted exposure. Using any legal deaths as the dependent variable (row 1), the 
coefficient on exposure to affirmative action litigation for all people, -0.13, is negative and 
significant at the 0.05 level. We can interpret this as an expected ​ 1.3 percentage point decrease 
in the probability that there will be any death due to legal intervention​ when​ there is a 10 
percentage point increase in the population of a county that is governed by affirmative action 
litigation. This effect appears to be driven by non-whites (p-value < 0.05), although the 
coefficient for whites is also negative and the coefficients for different races are not statistically 
different from each other. We also present estimates using the log of legal deaths as an outcome. 
Although all coefficients are all negative, they are not statistically significant.  
The coefficients on exposure to affirmative action litigation using intentional gun deaths 
as the dependent variable are also negative and significant at the 0.01 level. For a 10 percentage 
point increase in the population of a county that is governed by affirmative action litigation, we 
expect a 7.8 percent decrease in the number of intentional gun deaths. This relationship holds for 
all three examined demographics, although the magnitude varies.  
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 For suicides, there is no significant overall effect. However, the coefficients for 
nonwhites (0.13) and blacks (0.13) are positive and significant at the 0.10 level. Thus, if there is 
a 10 percentage point increase of a county that is governed by affirmative action litigation, we 
expect a 1.3 percentage point increase in the number of suicides by nonwhites and blacks. This 
could indicate that the diversification of police departments had an impact on the mental health 
of minorities, although the evidence is relatively weak and not robust to using offenses to weight 
exposure (see Appendix A). 
For total offenses, we could not examine how litigation affected reported offenses by 
race, as the UCR data did not provide a race breakdown for this variable. Nonetheless, we are 
still interested in trends for this variable as it is an indication of the level of crime. We can see 
that the coefficient on current-population-weighted exposure is positive and significant. Thus, for 
a 10 percentage point increase in the fraction of police interactions that are governed by 
affirmative action litigation, we expect a 4.0 percent increase in the number of offenses in a 
county.  
There was also a significant overall decrease in arrests. A 10 percentage point increase in 
the population of a county that is governed by affirmative action litigation leads to  an expected 
4.9 percent decrease in overall arrests. It is interesting to note that this effect is driven by the 
decrease in white arrests.  
The results using initial population exposure are similar to our main results in sign but 
usually not significant. We find similar results when we use the number of offenses to weight 
exposure (see Appendix A): the coefficients are always negative for legal deaths but only 
significant when using current levels and not initial levels of offenses. 
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 Table 3: Main Results 
 
Note: This table shows the relationship between the fraction of a county's police interactions that are governed by 
affirmative action litigation and various outcome variables for all persons, whites, nonwhites (includes blacks), and 
blacks. The primary dependent variable of interest is the Any Legal variable, which indicates the probability that a 
county will experience at least one death due to police. Other dependent variables include the ln of deaths due to 
police, ln of homicides, ln of intentional gun deaths, ln of suicides, ln of offenses, and ln of total arrests for a county. 
The independent variable of interest is exposure, which captures the extent to which a county's police interactions 
are impacted by litigation by averaging agency litigation status dummies weighted by population. Current 
Population weights by current population while Initial Population holds agency’s jurisdiction population constant to 
the earliest year population data is available from 1968-1978. We include a county's ln population, proportion 
minority population, county linear trends, and state-year interactions. Standard errors, clustered by county, are 
shown in parentheses. Significant at ^15%, *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
 
 
5B. Event Studies 
Our event study results support many of these findings and provide some insight on the 
credibility of our parallel trend assumption. For any legal deaths as the dependent variable, there 
do not seem to be differential pre-litigation trends between counties where any agency had been 
litigated and counties where no agency had been litigated. Most of the pre-litigation coefficients 
are insignificant with varying signs, lending credibility to the PTA. Post litigation, the 
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 coefficients are negative, many of which are significant (see Table 4). This is consistent with the 
result that affirmative action litigation  reduced the probability of a county having any police 
related death. The coefficients suggest that the effect shows up soon after litigation. This seems 
surprising as we would not expect litigation to have an immediate effect on police diversity since 
police departments would need time to hire and train new minority officers. Thus, it may be that 
something else about affirmative action litigation, not simply the increase in officer diversity, is 
causing this impact. This result supports our strategy of estimating a reduced form impact of 
litigation instead of instrumenting for police diversity with measures of litigation.  Figure 4 plots 
the event study results in column 1 and graphically demonstrates the result that there was no 
obvious trend before litigation, and that there was a negative trend in the probability of legal 
deaths after litigation. The event study for ln legal deaths essentially replicates the results of the 
event study for any legal deaths [see Appendix B] 
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 Table 4: Any Legal Event Study 
 
Note: This table shows the results of our event study for the Any Legal variable. Our independent variables of 
interest are the "years post litigation" dummies, which indicate the number of years since the earliest agency within 
a county was litigated. Years before the earliest litigation year have negative values, whereas years after the earliest 
litigation year have positive values. The dependent variables capture the difference between probability of there 
being a death due to police for a litigated county versus the probability for an unlitigated county. The difference is 
shown for all persons, whites, nonwhites (includes blacks), and blacks. We include a county's ln population, 
proportion minority population, county linear trends, and state-year interactions.  The final lines of the table test 
whether the pre-litigation and post-litigation coefficients are equal to 0. Standard errors, clustered by county, are 









 Figure 4 
 
Note:  This figure plots the coefficients on "years since the earliest agency within a county is litigated" dummies for 
all persons from the regression in Table 4. The error bars are 95% confidence intervals, after clustering by county. 
 
 
For minority ln suicides, the event study lends credence to our PTA, as there seem to be 
no pre-existing trends. However, only the coefficient on the 4 years post dummy is statistically 
significant (see Table 5).  Further, f-tests for all of the post litigation coefficients for nonwhites 








 Table 5: Ln Suicide Event Study
 
Note: This table shows the results of our event study for the Ln Suicides variable. Our independent variables of 
interest are the "years post litigation" dummies, which indicate the number of years since the earliest agency within 
a county was litigated. Years before the earliest litigation year have negative values, whereas years after the earliest 
litigation year have positive values. The dependent variables capture the percent difference of total suicides for 
litigated counties relative to unlitigated counties. The difference is shown for all persons, whites, nonwhites 
(includes blacks), and blacks. We include a county's ln population, proportion minority population, county linear 
trends, and state-year interactions. The final lines of the table test whether the pre-litigation and post-litigation 
coefficients are equal to 0. Standard errors, clustered by county, are shown in parentheses. Significant at ^15%, 
*10%, **5%, ***1%. 
 
For ln arrests, there is also no clear pre-litigation trend, lending further support to the 
PTA. The post-litigation coefficients are negative, and start to become significant 4 years after 
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 litigation (see Table 6). The lag may reflect the time it takes for police departments to hire more 
minority police officers after litigation is implemented. Figure 5 graphically demonstrates that 
affirmative action litigation had an effect on arrests.  
Table 6: Ln Arrests Event Study 
 
Note: This table shows the results of our event study for the Ln Arrests variable. Our independent variables of 
interest are the "years post litigation" dummies, which indicate the number of years since the earliest agency within 
a county was litigated. Years before the earliest litigation year have negative values, whereas years after the earliest 
litigation year have positive values. The dependent variables capture the percent difference of total arrests for 
litigated counties relative to unlitigated counties. The difference is shown for all persons, whites, nonwhites 
(includes blacks), and blacks. We include a county's ln population, proportion minority population, county linear 
trends, and state-year interactions. The final lines of the table test whether the pre-litigation and post-litigation 
coefficients are equal to 0. Standard errors, clustered by county, are shown in parentheses. Significant at ^15%, 
*10%, **5%, ***1%. 
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 Figure 5 
 
Note:  This figure plots the coefficients on "years since the earliest agency within a county is litigated" dummies for 
all persons from the regression in Table 6. The error bars are 95% confidence intervals, after clustering by county.  
 
The event study for ln gun deaths, on the other hand, casts doubt on our PTA. Most of the 
pre-litigation coefficients are positive and significant. The event study plot suggests that there 
was a pre-existing trend in gun deaths (see Table 7 and Figure 6). This potentially casts doubt on 
our main regression results on gun deaths (that affirmative action litigation decreases the amount 
of gun deaths). One possible explanation for why gun deaths may have been higher in these 
counties in the years before litigation and trending downwards has to do with the crack cocaine 
crisis during the 1970s and 1980s. We explore drug-related crime more closely in Section 5C and 
re-estimate our main specification controlling for ln drug arrests and gun deaths. 
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 Table 7: Gun Death Event Study 
 
Note: This table shows the results of our event study for the Ln Gun Deaths variable. Our independent variables of 
interest are the "years post litigation" dummies, which indicate the number of years since the earliest agency within 
a county was litigated. Years before the earliest litigation year have negative values, whereas years after the earliest 
litigation year have positive values. The dependent variables capture the percent difference of intentional gun deaths 
for litigated counties relative to unlitigated counties. The difference is shown for all persons, whites, nonwhites 
(includes blacks), and blacks. We include a county's ln population, proportion minority population, county linear 
trends, and state-year interactions. Standard errors, clustered by county, are shown in parentheses. Significant at 














 Figure 6 
 
Note:  This figure plots the coefficients on "years since the earliest agency within a county is litigated" dummies for 
all persons from the regression in Table 5. The error bars are 95% confidence intervals, after clustering by county. 
 
We also conducted an event study for offenses. According to these results, there seems to 
be no preexisting difference in trends between litigated and unlitigated counties. It also appears 
that affirmative action litigation did not affect offenses--our post-litigation coefficients are all 
statistically insignificant. The results for this event study do not seem to be consistent with our 
findings from our main regression. Our regression indicated a statistically significant increase in 
offenses with increased litigation exposure. The post-litigation trend on our event study, if 
anything, appears to be going in a decreasing direction. Thus, our results for whether affirmative 





Table 8: Ln Offenses Event Study 
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Note: This table shows the results of our event study for the Ln Offenses variable. Our independent variables of 
interest are the "years post litigation" dummies, which indicate the number of years since the earliest agency within 
a county was litigated. Years before the earliest litigation year have negative values, whereas years after the earliest 
litigation year have positive values. The dependent variables capture the percent difference of total offenses for 
litigated counties relative to unlitigated counties. The difference is shown for all persons. We include a county's ln 
population, proportion minority population, county linear trends, and state-year interactions. Standard errors, 








 Figure 7: Ln Offenses Event Study
 
Note:  This figure plots the coefficients on "years since the earliest agency within a county is litigated" dummies and 
the ln of a county’s total offenses. The error bars are 95% confidence intervals, after clustering by county. 
 
5C. Drug Regressions 
Our results suggest that gun deaths may have been trending differently in litigated 
counties relative to other counties prior to litigation. One possible explanation for this finding 
that would cast doubt on our PTA is that the drug crisis in the U.S. during the 1970s and 1980s 
may have disproportionately affected the same counties that were more heavily litigated. 
 To address this concern, we first examine trends in drug dependency deaths and drug-related 
arrests and how they relate to  affirmative action litigation. We conducted an event study for both 
variables, and found no significant trends in drug dependency deaths (see Appendix C). 
However, there was a clear trend for drug-related arrests (see Table 9). A plot of the results in 





Table 9: Ln Drug-Related Arrests Event Study 
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Note: This table shows the results of our event study for the Ln Drug Arrests variable. Our independent variables of 
interest are the "years post litigation" dummies, which indicate the number of years since the earliest agency within 
a county was litigated. Years before the earliest litigation year have negative values, whereas years after the earliest 
litigation year have positive values. The dependent variables capture the percent difference of drug-related arrests 
for litigated counties relative to unlitigated counties. The difference is shown for all persons, whites, nonwhites 
(includes blacks), and blacks. We include a county's ln population, proportion minority population, county linear 
trends, and state-year interactions. Standard errors, clustered by county, are shown in parentheses. Significant at 
















Note:  This figure plots the coefficients on "years since the earliest agency within a county is litigated" dummies for 




Note: This table shows the relationship between the fraction of a county's police interactions that are governed by 
affirmative action litigation and drug-related outcomes for all persons, whites, nonwhites (includes blacks), and 
blacks. Dependent variables include the ln of deaths due to drug dependency and the ln of drug-related arrests. The 
independent variable of interest is exposure, which captures the extent to which a county's police interactions are 
impacted by litigation by averaging agency litigation status dummies weighted by population. Current Population 
weights by current population while Initial Population holds agency’s jurisdiction population constant to the earliest 
year population data is available from 1968-1978 We include a county's ln population, proportion minority 
population, county linear trends, and state-year interactions. Standard errors, clustered by county, are shown in 
parentheses. Significant at ^15%, *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
 
We also ran our main regressions with drug dependency deaths and drug-related arrests 
as outcome variables (see Table 10) and find statistically significant effects. To address the 
possibility that our main regression results for any legal deaths are driven by trends in drug crime 
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 or drug deaths, we include a control variable for drug-related arrests into our main regression as 
a robustness check. We also included a control for gun deaths, as there seemed to be a trend in 
that variable as well. The relevant results are below: 
 
Table 11: Drug Arrest and Gun Death Controls 
 
Note: This table shows the relationship between the fraction of a county's police interactions that are governed by 
affirmative action litigation and various outcome variables for all persons, whites, nonwhites (includes blacks), and 
blacks. The primary dependent variable of interest is the Any Legal variable, which indicates the probability that a 
county will experience at least one death due to police. Other dependent variables include the ln of suicides and ln of 
total arrests for a county. The independent variable of interest is exposure, which captures the extent to which a 
county's police interactions are impacted by litigation by averaging agency litigation status dummies weighted by 
population. Current Population weights by current population while Initial Population holds agency’s jurisdiction 
population constant to the earliest year population data is available from 1968-1978. We include a county's ln 
drug-related arrests, ln gun deaths, ln population, proportion minority population, county linear trends, and 
state-year interactions. Standard errors, clustered by county, are shown in parentheses. Significant at ^15%, *10%, 
**5%, ***1%. 
 
After controlling for drug-related arrests and gun deaths, our conclusions from Table 3 
still seem to hold. Although the effects of litigation on any legal deaths are weaker with 
drug-related arrests as a control, the coefficients are still significant at the 10% level.  ​Overall, it 1
seems like affirmative action litigation decreased the likelihood that a county would have a death 
1 ​Although we did not see a trend in offenses, we also decided to run a regression with ln offenses in addition to 
drug arrests and ln gun deaths as a control. We thought that the actual number of offenses in a county may somehow 
impact policing (particularly arrests), and thought it would be a worthwhile robustness check. ​Our main results still 
hold after including ln offenses into the regression (see Appendix E). The coefficients for any legal deaths remain 
negative and significant. Interestingly, the effect for blacks actually increased in magnitude and significance with 
this additional control. The coefficients for ln arrests slightly lowered in magnitude but not significance relative to 
the regression with added drug arrest and gun death controls.  
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 due to police, particularly for minorities. Litigation also appears to decrease the amount of 
general arrests within a county.  
 
6. Limitations 
It is important to note some limitations for this strategy. ​Our observations were limited to 
the largest 479 state and local police departments in the U.S. Thus, our results may not be 
applicable to smaller departments, which may have different work dynamics or relationships 
with the community. This is problematic, as police shootings can certainly involve smaller 
agencies (e.g, Ferguson), and it is important to address issues in smaller agencies as well.  
Additionally, our results show that affirmative action litigation may decrease the 
probability of there being a death due to police interaction, particularly for minorities, and 
decrease the number of arrests. However, we do not know for certain if the diversity that resulted 
from affirmative action litigation produced these results, or if it was a different characteristic of 
or response to affirmative action litigation. Examining the effects of the event study, it seems as 
though there was almost an immediate impact of affirmative action litigation on the probability 
of deaths due to police. However, we would expect the hiring process of more minority officers 
in response to litigation to take a few years. Perhaps the fact that the significant negative effect of 
litigation persisted is due to police diversification, but the immediate effect may have been due to 




 In response to widely publicized police shootings of African Americans, various cities 
across the country have decided to recruit more minority police officers as one of the solutions. 
However, does this solution actually work? Surprisingly, there is very little empirical research 
that examines whether police department diversity actually reduces minority deaths due to 
police. Our paper contributes to the literature by specifically examining this issue, and also 
focuses on various important outcome measures such as gun-related deaths and arrests. We do 
this by using the Vital Statistics data, a dataset that has not previously been used to address this 
question in the economics literature.  
As we were unable to obtain information on demographic employment information of 
police agencies, we use affirmative action litigation as an instrument for police diversity but 
focus on the reduced form effect of affirmative action litigation itself. Police agencies and 
schools were the largest sectors in which affirmative action was implemented. Literature on 
affirmative action policies in various sectors have found that the policies successfully increase 
minority student enrollment. Previous research on police departments from McCrary (2007) and 
Miller and Segal (2012) have shown that merely being litigated increases the amount of minority 
officers at an agency. We used a legal database that was compiled by Miller and Segal that 
includes the affirmative action litigation status the ​479 largest state and local police departments 
in the U.S. For the outcome variables, we used the Vital Statistics for county-level information 
on deaths.  
Our analysis found that affirmative action litigation may have decreased a county’s 
probability that a person would die from a police interaction, and decreased the amount of a 
county’s arrests. The higher a county’s fraction of interactions that are governed by litigation, the 
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 lower the county’s probability was of having at least one person die due to interactions with the 
police. This effect was driven by non-whites and blacks. Additionally, the higher a county’s 
fraction of interactions that are governed by litigation, the fewer arrests there were for all 
persons. Our event studies for these variables further support these conclusions, and they lend 
credibility to our parallel trend assumption. We also saw that more exposure to affirmative action 
litigation seemed to increase minority suicides in all of our population weighted specifications, 
and our event study supports supports the notion that there were no pre-existing trends. However, 
our event study and F-tests of pre-litigation and post-litigation coefficients do not clearly show 
that affirmative action litigation had a definite effect on minority suicides. We found effects for 
gun violence, offenses, and drug-related arrests as well, but our event studies call into question 
the parallel trend assumptions for these variables. We also conducted a series of robustness 
checks that further support our findings.  
Our results have several implications for future research. We see that more affirmative 
action litigation exposure led to fewer arrests, though the desirability of this outcome is 
questionable. Fewer arrests may reflect less crime or less effective policing. Our results on 
offenses are inconclusive; future work is needed to distinguish these stories. Finally,affirmative 
action litigation decreased the probability of there being a police related death in a county, 
especially for minorities. This finding is consistent with the notion that hiring more minority 
officers may be an effective response to wanting fewer police shootings, and supports 
diversification as a strategy to reduce police induced deaths. Further research is needed to see 
whether hiring more minority officers is actually the driving mechanism in reducing police 
related deaths.  
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 Appendix A 
Main Specification Offense Weights 
 
Note: This table shows the relationship between the fraction of a county's police interactions that are governed by 
affirmative action litigation and various outcome variables for all persons, whites, nonwhites (includes blacks), and 
blacks. The primary dependent variable of interest is the Any Legal variable, which indicates the probability that a 
county will experience at least one death due to police. Other dependent variables include the ln of deaths due to 
police, ln of homicides, ln of intentional gun deaths, ln of suicides, and ln of total arrests for a county. The 
independent variable of interest is exposure, which captures the extent to which a county's police interactions are 
impacted by litigation by averaging agency litigation status dummies weighted by offense. Current Offense weights 
by current offenses while Initial Offense  holds agency’s jurisdiction offense constant to the earliest year offense 
data is available from 1968-1978. We include a county's ln population, proportion minority population, county linear 
trends, and state-year interactions. Standard errors, clustered by county, are shown in parentheses. Significant at 










 Appendix B 
Ln Legal Event Study 
 
Note: This table shows the results of our event study for the Ln Legal Deaths variable. Our independent variables of 
interest are the "years post litigation" dummies, which indicate the number of years since the earliest agency within 
a county was litigated. Years before the earliest litigation year have negative values, whereas years after the earliest 
litigation year have positive values. The dependent variables capture the percent difference of deaths due to legal 
intervention for litigated counties relative to unlitigated counties. The difference is shown for all persons, whites, 
nonwhites (includes blacks), and blacks. We include a county's ln population, proportion minority population, 
county linear trends, and state-year interactions. Standard errors, clustered by county, are shown in parentheses. 




 Appendix C 
Ln Drug Death Event Study
 
Note: This table shows the results of our event study for the Ln Drug Death variable. Our independent variables of 
interest are the "years post litigation" dummies, which indicate the number of years since the earliest agency within 
a county was litigated. Years before the earliest litigation year have negative values, whereas years after the earliest 
litigation year have positive values. The dependent variables capture the percent difference of drug dependency 
deaths for litigated counties relative to unlitigated counties. The difference is shown for all persons, whites, 
nonwhites (includes blacks), and blacks. We include a county's ln population, proportion minority population, 
county linear trends, and state-year interactions. Standard errors, clustered by county, are shown in parentheses. 












 Appendix D 
Offense Weights, Drug Arrests and Ln Gun Deaths Control 
 
Note: This table shows the relationship between the fraction of a county's police interactions that are governed by 
affirmative action litigation and various outcome variables for all persons, whites, nonwhites (includes blacks), and 
blacks. The primary dependent variable of interest is the Any Legal variable, which indicates the probability that a 
county will experience at least one death due to police. Other dependent variables include the ln of deaths due to 
police, ln of intentional gun deaths, ln of suicides, and ln of total arrests for a county. The independent variable of 
interest is exposure, which captures the extent to which a county's police interactions are impacted by litigation by 
averaging agency litigation status dummies weighted by offense. Current Offense weights by current offenses while 
Initial Offense  holds agency’s jurisdiction offense constant to the earliest year offense data is available from 
1968-1978. We include a county's ln drug-related arrests, ln gun deaths, ln population, proportion minority 
population, county linear trends, and state-year interactions. Standard errors, clustered by county, are shown in 





 Appendix E 
Ln Offenses, Ln Drug Arrests, Ln Gun Deaths as Controls 
 
Note: This table shows the relationship between the fraction of a county's police interactions that are governed by 
affirmative action litigation and various outcome variables for all persons, whites, nonwhites (includes blacks), and 
blacks. The primary dependent variable of interest is the Any Legal variable, which indicates the probability that a 
county will experience at least one death due to police. Other dependent variables include the ln of suicides and ln of 
total arrests for a county. The independent variable of interest is exposure, which captures the extent to which a 
county's police interactions are impacted by litigation by averaging agency litigation status dummies weighted by 
population. Initial Population is generated in the same way, but holds agency's jurisdiction populations constant to 
the earliest year population data is available from 1968-1978. We include a county's ln total offenses, ln drug-related 
arrests, ln gun deaths, ln population, proportion minority population, county linear trends, and state-year 














 Appendix F 
Restricted to Counties Only Ever Litigated 
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